Der Chef 1972 Stream Filme wie Der Chef
Mit diesem stilisierten Film Noir beendete der große französische Filmemacher Jean-Pierre Melville seine Regiekarriere. Das letzte Werk des. NEU: PODCAST: Die besten Streaming-Tipps gibt's im Moviepilot-Podcast Streamgestöber. Originaltitel: Un flic. Der Chef ist ein Actionfilm aus dem Jahr Der Chef ist ein Actionfilm aus dem Jahr von Jean-Pierre Melville mit Alain Delon, Richard Crenna und Catherine Deneuve. In Jean-Pierre Melvilles. Der Chef. (19)IMDb h 35min Clubbesitzer Simon raubt eine Bank aus. Ausgerechnet sein Format: Prime Video (streaming online video). Devices. Der Chef jetzt legal online anschauen. Der Film ist aktuell bei Der Chef () Der Chef 95 Min. | Deutsch, Französisch (OV) HD FSK 16 UT. Flatrate Prime. Leihen Der Chef (Un flic) 95 Min. Fehlt dein Lieblings-Streaming-Anbieter?
Der Chef ist ein Actionfilm aus dem Jahr von Jean-Pierre Melville mit Alain Delon, Richard Crenna und Catherine Deneuve. In Jean-Pierre Melvilles. Der Chef (Un flic): Thriller von Robert Dorfmann mit Catherine Deneuve/Alain Delon/Paul Crauchet. Jetzt im Kino. Der Chef. In Jean-Pierre Melvilles Gangsterfilm liefern sich Alain Delon und Richard Crenna ein Duell. Bewertung. Stars. Bewertung. Redaktions Kritik. Bilder. Https://arkivihalland.se/serien-stream-to-app/mother-2019-stream-deutsch.php Crenna. Nutzer haben kommentiert. Heist Movies von Le Samourai. Der eiskalte Engel. Blutige Hochzeit. Home Filme Der Chef. Https://arkivihalland.se/filme-deutsch-stream/kinderstars-heute.php Crauchet. Public Enemy No. Armee im Schatten.
Use the HTML below. You must be a registered user to use the IMDb rating plugin. Episodes Seasons. Edit Cast Complete series cast summary: Lenny Henry Gareth 20 episodes, Roger Griffiths Everton 19 episodes, Caroline Lee-Johnson Learn more More Like This.
Desmond's — Desmond, his non-confirming family and the regulars of his hairdressers in Peckham, London. Harry Enfield's Television Programme — My Hero — Comedy Fantasy Romance.
Waiting for God — Goodness Gracious Me — The Fall and Rise of Reginald Perrin — Let Them Eat Cake Comedy History.
Good Neighbors — Murder Most Horrid — Comedy Crime Mystery. Comedy Romance. Stars: Wilfrid Brambell, Harry H.
Corbett, Carolyn Seymour. Kingdom — Comedy Drama. Keeping Up Appearances — Genres: Comedy. Edit Did You Know?
Quotes Gareth : Everton, please remove the maggots, rat carcasses, and corpses of shocked health inspectors and make the place fit for the preparation of sodding food!
Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Report this. Add the first question. Edit Details Country: UK. Language: English.
Keep track of everything you watch; tell your friends. Full Cast and Crew. Release Dates. Official Sites. Company Credits.
Technical Specs. Plot Summary. Plot Keywords. Parents Guide. External Sites. User Reviews. User Ratings.
External Reviews. Metacritic Reviews. Photo Gallery. Trailers and Videos. Crazy Credits. Alternate Versions.
Rate This. History clearly points out that those who ignore the past are doomed to repeat old mistakes.
It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation.
I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of, airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.
Yet standing above all other influences was a revulsion against the mud and despair of the trenches.
Thus, it is not surprising that an Italian senior officer, Giulio Douhet, would argue that airpower could prevent the repetition of a war that had cost Italy more than , dead.
In terms of the first formulations of air doctrine, Douhet's thought did not prove particularly influential.
Yet, Douhet's theories are symptomatic of intellectual attitudes current among military and civilian thinkers in the post-world War I era.
They are, therefore, a useful point of departure. Douhet's central, single-minded argument was that the decisive mission for an air force was "strategic" bombing.
Douhet excluded the possibility of air defense, denied fighter aircraft a place in future air forces, and argued that close air support and interdiction were an irrelevant waste of aircraft.
The only role for the air force of the future would be that of "strategic" bombing. Douhet further reasoned that the more heavily armed bomber would always prove superior to the fighter in air-to-air combat.
Douhet's approach represented the hope that airpower and "strategic" bombing would enable international conflict to return to an era of short, decisive wars and thus would allow Europe to escape the mass slaughter of the last war.
However, nowhere in Douhet's writings is there a sense of the technological and industrial underpinnings necessary for air war.
This may subconsciously reflect the circumstance that Italy possessed none of the resources, expertise, or industrial requirements for such a war.
It is worth noting, however, that most other theorists of the period were similarly reluctant to recognize the technological and industrial complexities of their subject.
In retrospect, what makes the present-day conventional wisdom that Douhet was the prophet of airpower so surprising is the fact that his theory denigrated all the major missions of modern air forces except "strategic" bombing.
Douhet dismissed air defense, tactical air, airlift, XXlll. Not surprisingly, he also argued that airpower eliminated the requirement for armies and navies ; consequently, there was no need for interservice cooperation.
The theories of Douhet and other early airpower advocates, with their stress on the notion that "strategic" bombing was the exclusive air mission, have exercised a great influence on the development of air forces since that time.
Commentators on airpower have all too often tied their subject directly and exclusively to "strategic" bombing, while ignoring other possible applications.
Air forces, however, have had to perform a wide variety of tasks other than "strategic" bombing. The real contribution of airpower to final victory in the Second World War lay in the very diversity of its capability.
Ironically, the conduct of air operations in that war resembled, in many facets, the strategy of the previous conflict except that attrition came now in terms of aircraft and aircrews rather than mud-stained infantry.
Month after month, year after year, crews climbed into their aircraft to fly over the European continent.
Those in charge of the air battle came to measure success by drops in percentage points of bomber and fighter losses rather than in terms of yards gained.
As one commentator has pointed out : Despite the visions of its protagonists of prewar days, the air war during the Second World War It did not supplant the operations of conventional forces; it complemented them.
Victory went to the air forces with the greatest depth, the greatest balance, the greatest flexibility in employment. The result was an air strategy completely unforeseen by air commanders Rather, air superiority and the utilization of airpower to break the opponent proved to be elusive and intractable problems.
Enemy air forces could and did live to fight another day despite setbacks and defeat. Only the elimination of their supporting industries and resources, or the occupation of their bases by ground forces, guaranteed complete victory.
The accomplishment of the former task proved extraordinarily difficult, while the latter indicated a degree of interdependence among air, ground, and naval forces that airpower advocates had so casually dismissed before the war.
If the aircraft had added a new dimension to warfare, it had not changed the underlying principles.
While the concept of "strategic" bombing intrigued prewar air forces, practical factors-the "real world" of interservice relationships, defense priorities, political attitudes, and economic limitations-exercised an important influence over their establishment and development.
Entirely different strategic factors determined control over the constitution and strategies of each different European air force, not to mention the Army Air Corps in the United States.
To understand the course of those developments as well as the doctrine that guided the employment of airpower in the Second World War, one must grasp not only those factors influencing the air forces themselves but also the larger problems of national policy and strategy that influenced both politicians and the military.
The theories current throughout Europe in the 's and 's with respect to the future course of warfare in general and air war in particular also were present in Germany.
Conversely, and not surprisingly, the peculiar forces that had guided and molded German history exercised their influence on the growth and development of the Luftwaffe.
Like their counterparts in other nations, German airmen believed that their air force would be able to exercise an important, if not decisive, impact on a future war.
To them, aircraft would be the definitive "strategic" weapon in the coming conflict. That represented a strategic situation quite different from that facing British and American airmen.
Besides reflecting its society, the Luftwaffe reflected the traditions and values of the Prussian officer corps.
Like their brother officers in the army, Luftwaffe officers would prove imaginative, innovative, and highly competent in operational and tactical matters.
They would, however, prove themselves lost in the higher realms of strategy and grand strategy, and it would be in those realms that the Reich would founder.
After the war, the German generals and admirals would rush into print to prove that defeat had been largely the result of Hitler's leadership.
In fact, their strategic concepts in the war proved to be as flawed as had the Fiihrer's. The German generals and admirals aided and abetted Hitler's strategy in ; and when it succeeded beyond their wildest expectations with the fall of France, they reacted in awe, suspending reason for a blind faith in the invincibility of the Reich and its Fiihrer.
The strategic advice they tendered from that point forward ignored the industrial, economic, and political realities of war between industrialized nations that have existed since the American Civil War.
The failure of German grand strategy and mobilization in insured not only the defeat of the German armed forces and the Luftwaffe in the coming years but a catastrophe for the German nation as well.
Therefore, exploring the causes for the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the focus of this study, explains more than the downfall of an air force.
For a detailed discussion of this point, see the excellent work by Barry D. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine : A History ofbasic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Montgomery, , pp For the purposes of this study, the use of the term "strategic" bombing will have the word strategic inclosed within quotation marks, as this author believes that the use of the word strategic by airpower enthusiasts to connote a particular form of bombing distorts the classical meaning of the word.
The difficulty into which the misuse of this word has led historians might be best characterized by the following question : In May , given Germany's military situation, what was the best strategic use to which the Luftwaffe could be put : supporting the army's drive to the channel and the crushing of French and British land power, or attacking French factories and cities?
The answer is clear in a classical sense. Within the existing definitions of "strategic" and "tactical" bombing, it is not so clear.
See, in particular, the articles dealing with airpower that appeared in the Militdrwissenschaftliche Rundschau from through It also misses entirely the fact that a significant body within the Luftwaffe's high command were converts to the doctrine of "strategic" bombing before the outbreak of World War That Germany was not able to wage a successful "strategic" bombing campaign in reflected merely the fact that German air strategists in the prewar period, like those in other nations, had considerably overestimated their ability to inflict punishing strategic damage with the weapons at hand.
Before the war, the same trends that marked the air forces of Great Britain and the United States also were present in the officer corps of the Luftwaffe.
But an important geographic consideration, the fact that Germany was a continental power, had an additional impact on German strategic thinking.
In any conceivable conflict involving the military forces of the Reich, Germany faced the probability of land operations at the outset of hostilities.
Thus, it would scarcely improve Germany's strategic position if-at the same time that the Luftwaffe launched aerial attacks on London, Paris, and Warsaw-Germany's enemies defeated the Wehrmacht on the border and overran Silesia, East Prussia, and the Rhineland.
Imports of oil, rubber, aluminum, and other critical materials necessary for the continued functioning of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht were all subject to blockade.
Moreover, in peacetime the Germans had to use a substantial portion of their industrial production to export goods in order to earn the foreign exchange necessary to pay for these strategic raw material imports needed for rearmament.
Symptomatic of this German economic vulnerability was the situation in the petroleum industry. In order to maintain an increasingly motorized economy and to cut down on dependence from foreign sources, the Germans pushed construction of synthetic fuel plants i.
While the percentage of synthetic fuel in terms of consumption steadily increased in this period, Germany imported more fuel in than she had at the beginning of the decade.
In June of that year, supplies in storage tanks could cover only 25 percent of mobilization requirements--on the average, four months of full wartime needs.
Supplies of aviation lubricants were as low as 6 percent of mobilization requirements. In fact, the most serious constraint on German rearmament in the 's was the lack of foreign exchange.
Without hard currency to cover imports, German industry could not reach the level of armament production demanded by the Wehrmacht and Hitler.
Indeed, the Reich experienced increasing difficulties in acquiring these raw materials required for military production.
A series of more difficult economic crises, caused by a lack of foreign exchange, marked the course of German rearmament throughout the 's.
As a result, holdings of foreign exchange steadily dwindled, and this shortage of hard currency in the thirties set definite limits on the level of raw material imports available to support rearmament.
Moreover, foreign suppliers already were becoming doubtful as to the liquidity of the German economy and, as a result, would not deliver on credit.
From March to December , stockpiles of major industrial raw materials fell dramatically ; and for the remainder of the 's, the German economy lived a hand-to-mouth existence, scratching to find sufficient foreign exchange to pay for imports.
By , the German economy was suffering serious shortages of steel because of a lack of ore imports, while the industry itself was operating at barely 83 percent of capacity.
In November , Hermann G6ring admitted that the German economic infrastructure had reached a point of maximum economic distress.
Simultaneously, he announced further reduction in Wehrmacht allocations : steel, 30 percent ; copper, 20 percent ; aluminum, 47 percent ; rubber, 14 percent.
Neither were available in sufficient quantity to build a massive "strategic" bombing force.
Moreover, the army, given Germany's strategic position as a continental power, laid claims to resources that any rearmament program had to meet.
Finally, the country's doubtful access to foreign supplies of petroleum products raises the question as to whether Germany could support an independent "strategic" bombing offensive.
Thus, it is clear that definite economic constraints limited German air planners in the creation of the Luftwaffe, and the force they molded both before and during the war was influenced by different strategic factors than those guiding either the British or the Americans.
Considering the fact that within six and a half years this force would go to war and render vital support in the early campaigns, the Germans were most successful in their efforts.
The first strategic problem on Hitler's ascension to power in January was the perception that a still disarmed and vulnerable Reich faced the possibility of a preventive war, waged by her neighbors to stop the resurrection of Germany as a military power.
As Hitler told his generals shortly after he had come to power, if France possessed any statesmen, she would wage war in the immediate future.
Future "strategic" bombing capabilities would do nothing for present military difficulties, while the tactical potential of a less sophisticated, more conventional air force would be more quickly realized for utilization in a contemporary military confrontation.
German interest in a "strategic" air weapon goes back to the early days of the First World War. Frustrated at the imposition of a distant blockage in by the Royal Navy, German naval strategists looked for a means to strike at the British Empire.
Such attacks, he argued, "may be expected,whether they involve London or the neighborhood of London, to cause panic in the population which may.
I contend here I go for the standpoint of "war to the knife," but I am not in favor of "frightfulness Also, single bombs from flying machines are wrong ; they are odious when they hit and kill old women, and one gets used tothem.
If [however] one could set fire to London in thirty places, then what in a small way is 16 odious would retire before something fine and powerful.
When the Zeppelin campaign failed, the Germans attacked London with the heavier-than-air bomber. That campaign, even if it did not achieve great material damage, did lead to the creation ofthe Royal Air Force.
Not only was Germany denied access to new technology as represented by the submarine, the airplane, and the tank, but the peace also severely limited the size and capability of Germany's military services.
The victorious Allies, however, could not prevent the Germans from thinking about their experiences and the weapons ofthe last war.
Hans von Seeckt, father of the Reichswehr, insured that the miniscule army left to Germany included a small body of officers who had had experience in the conduct ofthe air battles in the Great War.
Limitations imposed by Versailles forced German aviation into a narrow framework. Nevertheless, extensive subsidies to civil aviation contributed to the survival of Germany's aviation industry, and preparations for air rearmament during the Weimar Republic played a significant role in the establishment of the Luftwaffe during the Nazi period.
Still, the problems facing the Nazis in January in the creation of an air force that could serve as an effective tool of diplomatic and military policy were enormous.
Only a tiny cadre of experienced officers existed within the army and navy ; Lufthansa experience was not directly convertible into a military force ; and the German aircraft industry, weakened not only by the depression but also by internecine quarrels amongst its almost bankrupt firms, was not prepared for massive expansion.
The Luftwaffe was favored at its birth, however, by the fact that its patron and first leader, Hermann Goring, was Hitler's right-hand man.
Goring's political pull insured that the Luftwaffe gained position as an independent service and that it enjoyed a privileged status in interservice arguments over allocation of funding and resources.
While funding did not represent a problem in the early days of. Unfortunately, however, for the efficient functioning of the German command system, G6ring, as Minister of Aviation, refused to subordinate himself to the Minister of War, Werner von Blomberg.
Thus, Blomberg faced the impossible task of coordinating and controlling the three services. His problems were further compounded by the fact that Goring, as Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, went around him at every opportunity.
Initially, G6ring's political tasks as Hitler's chief aide during the consolidation of power the establishment of the Gestapo, the savaging of the Communists, and the purge of Ernst R6hm and the S.
G6ring's mental framework was that of a squadron-level fighter pilot which he had been in the First World War ; and throughout his tenure as Luftwaffe commander, he remained largely ignorant of supply, logistics, strategy, aircraft capabilities, technology, and engineering-in other words, just about everything having to do with airpower.
Compounding his ignorance was the fact that G6ring took a rather loose view on the subject of hard work, and his visits to the Air Ministry were sporadic at best.
In July , during an address to aircraft manufacturers, Goring even admitted that he saw Ernst Udet, at this time in charge of all the Luftwaffe's technical departments, only once a week.
Nevertheless, in the short term, G6ring's political pull was ofgreat use in the establishment of an independent air arm.
G6ring was particularly fortunate in his leading subordinate. Erhard Milch, G6ring's and Hitler's selection for the position of State Secretary in the new Air Ministry, possessed tremendous drive, a thorough knowledge of the production capabilities of the German aircraft industry, a detailed understanding of its managers and designers, and, perhaps most importantly, excellent connections within the political leadership of the newly established Third Reich.
Those regular officers never forgot that Milch had left the military after the war to become the eventual head oflufthansa. The other senior officers of the Luftwaffe came from the Reichswehr.
Of particular note here is Blomberg's contribution to the establishment of the new service's officer corps.
In , on the occasion of the founding of the Air Ministry, Blomberg commented that the new Luftwaffe would require an elite officer corps with "a tempestuous spirit of attack.
Significantly, not only personnel with flying experience moved to the Air Ministry but also highly trained officers.
When Wever died in an aircraft crash in , Blomberg initially considered offering Goring the future chief of the army's general staff, General Franz Halder, as a replacement.
Jeschonnek, among other accomplishments, had finished first in his class at the Kriegsakademie, usually a sure sign of promise for a quick rise to the top of the military profession.
By January , a further 70 had followed along with 1, noncommissioned officers NCOs and enlisted men. Blomberg demanded that individuals selected for transfer represent the "best of the best.
The simple mechanics of expansion alone ruled out such a possibility. From to , the Luftwaffe developed a personnel strength of approximately flying officers, flak antiaircraft officers, and 17, men.
In addition to the army, the officer corps came from widely different sources ; many pilots entered the Luftwaffe directly from civil aviation, while veterans of the First World War further fleshed out the officer corps.
From this mixture, the Luftwaffe expanded to a strength of 15, officers and , men by the outbreak of the war. Shortly after the surprise Japanese attack on Hawaii when Hitler asked his military staff for the location of Pearl Harbor, none, including his Luftwaffe officers, could locate the American naval base.
The result was that they became at best technocrats and operational experts with limited vision. At the outset of rearmament in , German planners faced the problem as to what role the Luftwaffe would play within the larger framework of national strategy.
In May , Milch, the key figure in the Luftwaffe's organization and development in the period, received a major study from one of his Lufthansa subordinates, Dr.
Robert Knauss, on the strategic concept for the new air force. He believed that the purpose of the regime was the "restoration of Germany's great power position in Europe" and argued that since.
To overcome German military weakness through rearmament, thereby re-establishing Germany's great power status, Knauss suggested the rapid creation of a strong air force.
The decisive element in this force would be the deterrent effect of a fleet of four-engine bombers. Knauss argued that modern industrialized society offered targets which, when destroyed, would halt the enemy's industrial production and that population centers offered the possibility of breaking the enemy's morale.
Naturally, he felt that the newly created totalitarian society of Germany could endure the pressures of bombing better than the fractured societies ofthe British and French democracies.
Thus, if Germany possessed a "strategic" bombing fleet, her putative enemies-poland and France-would think seriously before incurring the risk of air attack on major population centers.
Above all, Knauss argued that the creation of such a bombing fleet offered a greater possibility for affecting the European military balance than did the establishment of army divisions or the construction of naval surface units.
The creation of such a bomber force aborted for several reasons. First, the army was hardly enthusiastic about such a strategic conception.
Colonel Konrad Gossler, head of the Truppenamt's operation section, argued that a clear separation between the homeland and the combat front no longer existed.
Thus, both opposing air forces possessed the same opportunity to attack their enemy's homeland. Moreover, since the beginning of time, Gossler argued, each new weapon had led many to conclude that the old weapons of war were no longer needed.
This had simply not happened. Finally, he objected that such a conception, if realized, "might destroy war by making it impossible for both sides.
During the summer of , Milch and his planners found that they could barely squeeze 1, aircraft out of industry for the first production program.
Most of that effort consisted of training aircraft to expand the flying base. From a January industrial base of 4, workers, the aircraft industry expanded to 16, workers in and to , workers by the fall of To a great extent, this represented Milch's great triumph as an organizer and bureaucrat.
While Milch played the decisive role in the administrative and industrial tasks of creating the Luftwaffe, Wever played a no-less-important role in formulating the new service's doctrine and strategy.
He was not an unabashed advocate of "strategic" bombing but rather argued for a broadly based air strategy. Wever did not believe that the Luftwaffe's existence as a separate service gave it a mission entirely independent of the army and navy.
Rather, he argued that its mission should complement those of the other services. Thus, the Luftwaffe's contribution to victory could involve attacks on an enemy's air forces, his army, his fleet, or.
The conditions of the general situation and overall national strategy would determine in what form one would wage the air battle.
While not denying the possibility of air defense or the importance of fighters, Wever felt that the "decisive weapon of air warfare is the bomber.
A war game conducted during the winter of indicated that a bomber fleet alone could not immediately destroy the enemy's air fleet.
The conclusion was that strong fighter forces, as well as antiaircraft guns, were necessary to protect the Reich's industrial and population centers.
It was not meant to restrict or dogmatize but rather to give air force commanders the widest latitude and to encourage maximum flexibility.
Among the chief points enunciated was the reiteration ofwever's point that the employment of the Luftwaffe should reflect the overall framework of national grand strategy.
Within grand strategy, the critical tasks of the Luftwaffe would be the attainment and maintenance of air superiority, support of the army and the navy, attacks on enemy industry, and interdiction between front and homeland.
In all likelihood, however, one could probably not clearly separate the struggle with an enemy air force from support provided to the army and navy.
Unlike most airpower theorists, he showed a ready understanding for the fact that air superiority would be a most elusive goal. Changing technical capabilities, new production, and replacement of losses would all combine to allow the enemy to fight another day.
While Wever felt that "strategic" bombing attacks on the enemy's industrial and economic sources of power could have an absolute impact, he warned that such an offensive might take too long to be decisive and might thus be too late to help the army and the navy.
He emphasized that only the strongest cooperation among the three services could achieve the overall objectives of national grand strategy.
The air war against the enemy industrial base should occur only when 1 an opportunity existed to affect quickly the war's course, 2 when land and naval preparations had prepared the way, 3 when a stalemate had occurred, or 4 when a decisive effect could only be achieved through the destruction of the enemy's economic sources of power.
Wever's death in the spring of was a major blow to the Luftwaffe. However, it did not result in cancellation of the four-engine "strategic" bomber project as some have claimed.
Moreover, the long lead-time required for engine development constrained German aircraft design throughout the 's. The Germans did embark on the He project in in the belief that Heinkel could design and build a long-range "strategic" bomber by the early 's.
The design of the He , in effect, represented an effort to shortcut the development process of a high-powered engine for a heavy bomber by placing four engines within two nacelles.
Heinkel designers expected that by cutting down on the drag, they would have a bomber comparable to other four-engine aircraft with more powerful engines.
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, they were never able to overcome the difficulties inherent in the design ; hence the failure of the program reflected the failure of engineering and not a lack of interest in "strategic" bombing.
Moreover, a significant portion of the Luftwaffe's doctrinal thinking remained enamored with "strategic" bombing throughout the thirties.
There was an obvious reason why this should be so : The concepts of total war and total mobilization had proved attractive to much of the German military throughout the interwar period.
While Seeckt argued for establishment of an elite army, Ludendorff articulated the concept that modern war had become total. Unlike most interwar military thinkers who sought to escape the horrors of World War I's mass warfare, Ludendorff embraced what had happened and argued that Germany must prepare in ruthless fashion during peace for the next war.
Among other things, Ludendorff argued that war involved the entire population in the conflict, not just armies. In his view, economic production had become as important as battles on the frontline.
Hitler's popularity with the masses offered the possibility of establishing a national cohesion that the conception of total war demanded.
American designations do. The text will reflectnational preferences. Thus, Ludendorff's conception of total war and the mass movement of the Nazi Party provided an affinity between the military and the National Socialist movement that helps explain the readiness of the officer corps to serve a party that hardly represented their upper-class attitudes.
Many within the Luftwaffe found in this political and psychological preparation for war a basis to argue that the next war would be a total war of the air and that because of the national unity that the Nazis had created, Germany could better withstand such a struggle.
In the May memorandum discussed above, Knauss argued that "the terrorizing of the enemy's chief cities and industrial regions through bombing would lead that much more quickly to a collapse of morale, the weaker the national character of his people is, and the more that social and political rifts cleave his society.
There, under his leadership, the emphasis remained solidly on "strategic" bombing until the outbreak of the war. Nearly all lectures concerned the "strategic" uses of airpower ; virtually none discussed tactical cooperation with the army.
The prestigious Militdrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, the new journal of the War Ministry, founded in , published a number of theoretical pieces on future developments in air war.
Nearly all discussed the use of "strategic" airpower with some emphasizing that aspect of air warfare to the exclusion of others.
The maneuverability and technical capability of the new generation of bombers were such that "already in today's circumstances the bomber offensive would be as unstoppable as the flight of a shell.
Interservice cooperation did not mean dividing the Luftwaffe up and parceling out its personnel and materiel to support ground or naval tactical purposes.
The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards a "strategic" bombing capability is attributable to several factors.
The first is that many within the Luftwaffe thought that they possessed sufficient capability with their twin-engine aircraft to launch "strategic" attacks against Germany's most likely continental opponents-france, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
England presented greater Concluding the spring planning effort, Felmy admitted to his subordinates that the Luftwaffe did not yet possess any of the prerequisites for a successful "strategic" bombing offensive against Great Britain.
He did suggest, however, that the panic that had broken out in London in September at the height of the Munich crisis indicated that a massive aerial onslaught directed against London might break Britain's powers of resistance.
Moreover, not only did Germany not possess the economic strength and resources to build a "strategic" bombing force on the scale of the British and American effort of but few airmen of any nation in the prewar period had foreseen the enormous magnitude of the industrial and military effort that "strategic" bombing would require.
Thus, it is not surprising that Germany was not much better prepared to launch a "strategic" bombing campaign than Britain in As previously mentioned, Wever's death in was disastrous for the future course of the Luftwaffe but in a sense other than that which most historians have suggested.
First, he provided the glue that held the Luftwaffe together in the early rearmament years. He got on relatively well with other Luftwaffe leaders, including Milch, and all respected his qualities of intellect and leadership.
Second, and equaljy important, Wever possessed both a practical military mind and a first-class strategic sense that thought in terms of the long pull and not just immediate,,operational problems.
Given the financial and raw material constraints on rearmament, Wever could not have created a "strategic" bombing force in the thirties in terms of what the United States Army Air Forces USAAF would have in and Nevertheless, his presence would have mitigated the rather haphazard approach that characterized the Luftwaffe in the late thirties and early forties.
The caliber of Wever's successors underlines his importance to the Luftwaffe. Albert Kesselring, his immediate successor, was a troop leader par excellence, but overall he was not an effective Chiefof Staff and did not get along well with Milch.
The back-biting between the two led to Kesselring's replacement by Hans-Jurgen Stumpff within a year. Despite his brilliance at the Kriegsakademie, Jeschonnek proved no better than his predecessors.
He was arrogant, shortsighted, and had had several bitter run-ins with Milch. Shortly after Munich, Hitler demanded a fivefold increase in the Luftwaffe by , an impossible goal given the economic constraints and the megalomaniacal proportion of the program.
Such a force would require 85 percent of the world's aviation fuel and would cost 60 million RM, a total equivalent to all German defense spending for the period.
Senior officers correctly concluded that there was no. Jeschonnek, however, announced, "Gentlemen, in my view it is our duty to support the Fuhrer and not work against him.
He now severely constrained Milch by balancing the State Secretary with others within the Luftwaffe's bureaucracy. Ernest Udet, a great fighter pilot in World War I and barnstormer of the 's, received an appointment as head of the Luftwaffe's technical departments as well as the Office of Air Armament where he controlled research and development for the Luftwaffe.
Udet did not possess the technical or engineering skills to handle such responsibilities and was a dreadful administrator.
He had no less than 26 separate departments reporting directly to him. Milch was increasingly isolated from the centers of power; and the other top leaders, such as Kesselring, Udet, and Jeschonnek, did not possess Wever's strategic insight.
Long-range planning and strategic thinking went by the boards, and the Luftwaffe increasingly became a force that reacted to day-to-day political and operational pressures.
The result of this increasingly chaotic organizational situation showed up most directly in the production programs of the late prewar period.
Even considering their raw material shortages and their economic and foreign exchange difficulties, the Germans undercut the production capacity of their aircraft industry.Der Chef (). Un Flic. Französischer FSK: Kinostart/Streaming: Der Chef - Catherine Deneuve und Alain Delon. News. TV-Tipp für. Der Chef. In Jean-Pierre Melvilles Gangsterfilm liefern sich Alain Delon und Richard Crenna ein Duell. Bewertung. Stars. Bewertung. Redaktions Kritik. Bilder. Der Chef (Un flic): Thriller von Robert Dorfmann mit Catherine Deneuve/Alain Delon/Paul Crauchet. Jetzt im Kino. Der Chef (). Originaltitel: Un flic. Jetzt anschauen. Stream. Amazon Prime Video. Flat HD. IM ANGEBOT. Jetzt anschauen. Filter. Bester Preis. SD. HD. 4K.